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What Does a White Woman Look Like? Racing
and Erasing in Law
Katherine M. Franke*
In significant ways, legal texts produce a narrative of national identity.
They weave stories about who we are, what we are committed to, and what
we expect of one another, individually and collectively. The concept of
justiciability can be understood as a set of rules determining what stories
courts are allowed to tell about who we are and who we can be. In this
sense, Ronald Dworkin's account of judging as writing ongoing chapters
in a chain novel provides a compelling conception of law as both de-
scribing where we have been and directing where we are going.1 If the
salience of national identity is derived, in significant part, from our
membership in an imagined community,' then the production of a national
symbolic through legal storytelling is an appropriate and legitimate role for
courts-particularly in a nation as large as ours. In this process, certain
foundational fictions, like "We the People," provide the glue that over time
binds a people to its past and to one another as a nation.
But should law play the same role with respect to other aspects of
human identity? I think not. Current debates surrounding affirmative
action, congressional redistricting, the Million Man March, and the
appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court all represent
cultural flashpoints in an ongoing national discussion about two funda-
mental questions: what does it mean to have a race or be a member of a
particular race, and who has the authority to decide?
In the service of enslaving, segregating, and subordinating African
Americans, law has claimed for itself the authoritative license to tell the
story of racial meaning in this country-whether by declaring a certain race
of people the status of property,3 by defining as negro any person who has
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. J.D. 1986, Northeastern
University; LL.M. 1993, J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 229,228-38 (1986) (comparing the judge to a novelist
who "interprets the chapters he has been given in order to write a new chapter, which is then added
to what the next novelist receives, and so on").
2. BENEDiCr ANDERSON, IMAGINED CommuNIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONAuSM 14-16 (1983).
3. E.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857) ("The unhappy black race
were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never
thought of or spoken of except as property .... ).
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one drop of negro blood,4 or by determining that race is a factor that may
not be taken into account in the distribution of social goods or political
rights because our Constitution is color-blind.5
Therefore, I have selected Sunseri v. Cassagne6 as my favorite judi-
cial opinion. It represents an absolutely fascinating judicial confrontation
with the problems of proof that arise when racial identity is litigated in a
manner similar to that of, say, quieting title.7 In Sunseri the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered an appeal from a trial court order granting the
request of Cyril Sunseri, a white man, that his marriage be annulled
because, he maintained, his wife was legally negro.8 Verna Cassagne, the
woman Sunseri married and who all agreed was phenotypically white,
sought a divorce and alimony because, she insisted, she was white.9 In
1935, when the couple was married, the state of Louisiana prohibited and
rendered void the marriage of any white person to any person having a
trace of negro blood.'
The court was thus faced with adjudicating Vema Cassagne's racial
identity. It was presented with this problem only because it took it as
given that looking like and identifying as a white person did not mean that
one was a white person. Several interesting consequences flow from this
conception of racial identity: if a person could look white, but not be
white, then what does it mean to be white? Could one be white but not
look white? Perhaps looking white is a necessary yet not sufficient
condition of being white. What does a white woman look like anyway?
If phenotype is not what racial identity means, then is how you look a
representation of racial identity? If so, a representation of what? Finally,
who should decide the answers to any of these questions?
In determining whether Cassagne possessed a trace of negro blood, the
court rejected the reliability of Cassagne's white looks and denied her the
4. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 (1967) (striking down a Virginia miscegenation
statute that in part stated, "Every person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be
deemed and taken to be a colored person ... ." (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1960 Repl.
Vol.)); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382 (1946) (citing the state codes of Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Virginia as defining a person with "any ascertainable
Negro Blood" as a colored person for the purposes of separation).
5. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2598 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
assumptions upon which ourvote dilution decisions havebeen based should be repugnantto any nation
that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.").
6. 196 So. 7 (La. 1940) [hereinafter Sunseri I].
7. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1725-45
(1993) (arguing that "whiteness" is theoretically, expectationally, functionally, and legally akin to a
property right).
8. Sunseri 11, 196 So. at 7.
9. See id. at 9 ("[T]he defendant and her mother have always been considered as being of the
white race by their acquaintances in the City of New Orleans.").
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (Bobs-Merrill 1932) (repealed 1972).
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authority to declare her own race. Thus, the court had to look to other
evidence to prove her "true race"-statutorily defined in sanguinary terms.
Because there is no scientific test to determine either the racial makeup of
particular blood samples or the percentage of a particular kind of racialized
blood that a person has in her veins, racial identity quickly reveals itself to
be a metaphor, essentialized through the sign of blood. But how does one
go about proving a metaphor? By resort to anecdote, of course-anecdote
masquerading as objective fact. Given the statute at issue, Cassagne's
racial identity was to be resolved atavistically, that is, by focusing upon the
racial identity of Verna Cassagne's relatives, particularly her great-great
grandmother Fanny Ducre, a slave."1 Sunseri maintained she was "a full-
blooded negress," while Cassagne swore she was an Indian."2
Both parties relied heavily on anecdotal testimony to show the race of
Cassagne's relatives. Cassagne showed that her mother was christened and
confirmed as a white person in a white church, educated as a white girl in
a white school, registered as a white democratic voter, patronized hotels
as a white woman, and traveled as a white person in buses, railroad cars,
and streetcars. 3 When Verna was born, her mother was assigned to the
white maternity ward.' And, if that weren't enough, the court noted that
all of Verna's parents' friends and associates were white. The court thus
observed that "the overwhelming testimony [is] that [Vernal and her
immediate associates have always been regarded as members of the white
race and have associated with persons of that race."15
Yet, proof of this nature demonstrates the social, not legal, race of
Cassagne and her relatives. Given the impossibility of proving legal race
according to the sanguinary formula set forth in the statute, what else could
she look to? One might wonder how evidence of this sort survived a
relevance objection from Sunseri. While the court did not address the
issue, proof of social race was relevant to a determination of legal race on
two primary grounds: First, one might believe that social race bears a
"stands for" relationship to legal or true race. In this sense, social race
was indirect proof of the thing itself. Second, one might argue that
notwithstanding her actual sanguinary pedigree or lack thereof, the
community or an intimate associate such as a husband, or both, were
estopped from denying Cassagne's whiteness where she and her relatives
had relied, over generations, on the community's and her husband's acquie-
scence in and acceptance of her identity as white. Given the great social
significance of and investment in rigid racial boundaries, the court was not
11. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 185 So. 1, 2 (La. 1938) [hereinafter Sunseril].
12. Id.
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Sunseri I, 196 So. 7, 9 (La. 1940).
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prepared to allow the conduct of some members of the community to bind
the larger culture by permitting a kind of racial amnesty for people like
Cassagne who could pass. Passing was not and could not be the same
thing as being white.
Ultimately, the court determined that the question of Cassagne's true
race turned on the contents of three legal documents: Cassagne's birth
certificate, which registered her as colored, and the marriage license
applications of her mother's sisters, which had been stamped "colored." 6
The court then proceeded to cite approvingly the testimony of two white
men who had stated that they "knew" that many of Cassagne's relatives
were negro and that they had always been so regarded in the commu-
nity. 7 Based upon this, the court concluded that it had no alternative but
to affirm the annulment of the marriage of Sunseri and Cassagne because
there was "no room for doubt" that Cassagne was legally negro.3
This case shows the authority of law to race bodies through what Eva
Saks calls an autonomous miscegenous discourse' 9-autonomous in the
sense that the legal meaning of race stands independent of and often in
opposition to the social meaning of race. As such, in cases like Sunseri a
person who is socially white can be declared legally black. Verna
Cassagne told a story about her racial identity that was authentic-for her.
The court and Cyril Sunseri, however, had another story of what it meant
to be a white woman in Louisiana in 1940. Many may agree that racial
identity is not something that we can take literally at face value, but rather
is something that needs interpretation. What then emerges is a struggle
over whose interpretation counts-law's "official" story or the story of the
party to be raced?
At stake in the current debates about affirmative action, racial
redistricting, Justice Thomas's ascension to the Supreme Court, and the
Million Man March are fundamental questions about what it means to be
African American and who gets to decide. There are many who claim that
Justice Thomas is not really black. Or that he has betrayed his black
identity. Many have criticized the vision of African-American masculinity
that was promoted by the leaders of the Million Man March in Washington
last year." What was powerful about the event, however, was the
16. Id. at 7-8.
17. Id. at 8-9.
18. Id. at 7.
19. See Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, RARrrAN, Fall 1988, at 39, 40
("[M]iscegenation cases have a relative autonomy from other social definitions of miscegenation. This
autonomy, along with their internal cohesiveness and cross-references, allow them to be analyzed as
a genre: miscegenation discourse.").
20. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, 'Unity'March Exclusion Divides Women, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 17,
1995, at A14 ("Listen carefully to what the leaders of this event are saying: 'We've been bad masters;
now we're going to be good ones.'" (quoting Marcia Gillespie)).
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wresting of control of the instruments of identity away from government
and the assertion of a degree of agency by some African Americans with
respect to what it means to be an African-American, man, at this time, in
this culture.
The power to name oneself is fundamentally critical to any individual
and to any civil rights movement. One of the negative consequences of
affirmative action has been the degree to which control over the meaning
of racial difference and identity has been ceded to government for the
purpose of achieving remedial redistribution of resources. The government
now has interpreted the goal of our constitutional and statutory equality
principles to be the creation of a color-blind society. The call for children
to be judged by the content of their characters and not by the color of their
skin has been taken to mean that we should aspire to a world in which
racial differences are understood as normatively equivalent to differences
in hair color-that is, meaningless. The radical individualism of this
normative vision of the Fourteenth Amendment has frustrated the empow-
erment of peoples of color in this country. A politics of empowerment, as
contrasted with an ethic of formal equality, requires a thick conception of
racial identity produced through a fluid cultural, nonlegal process of self-
definition engaged in by the communities to be empowered. Law is ill-
suited to this task because racial meanings are always local and partial-
they are always in media res.
Whether the state invokes its power to reinforce the salience of race,
as it did in Sunseri, or to erase the salience of race, as it has with
contemporary equality jurisprudence, the state renders legally static that
which must remain contested and fluid. The cultural contestation of racial
meaning and identity must be reclaimed from government as a significant
foundation of our struggles for racial empowerment. Empowerment
requires not only that we demand what we want, but also that we define
who "we" are.
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